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“Ourworld”: a feminist approach to Global Constitutionalism 
 
I. Introduction  
 
The ‘story’ proffered by global constitutionalism is almost unequivocally positive.1 It 
emerged in a period where the tangibility of international law’s potential to become a system 
centred in legitimacy was, perhaps, at its height.2 Any persistent flaws in international law 
could be remedied by recognising an existing culture steeped or becoming steeped in the 
rule of law, democracy, division of power and checks and balances. But, as with most positive 
narratives, the question ‘better for whom’ is seldom asked. Whose ideal is being created? 
This article asks what a feminist global constitutionalism ideal – a feminist constitutionalist 
utopia – might look like.  
The term ‘utopia’, first coined by Thomas More, is a much older expression of political hope.3 
Utopian literatures, from Plato’s The Republic to More’s Utopia or William Morris’ News from 
Nowhere, have straddled literary art and political treatise.4 More recent utopian literature has 
used speculative fiction (such as science fiction and fantasy) as a mode for discussing new 
utopias.5 Yet, feminist utopias, presented in speculative fiction, are rarely read or considered 
as political or legal treatises. Science fiction (like international and constitutional law 
scholarship) has historically been a male, conservative forum where women and minority 
voices are less prominent or intentionally omitted.6 This article places feminist utopias at the 
centre of our analysis and considers what they offer those seeking a feminist global 
constitutionalism and what work remains to be done.  
Donna Haraway contends that ‘science fiction is political theory.’7 Patricia Melzer proffers 
that science fiction is crucial for ‘feminist theorizing outside the science fiction community’ 
and that ‘science fiction can be understood as part of a feminist criticism of existing power 
                                                          
1 ‘Global constitutionalisation’ is the process of constitutionalising international law and governance, ‘global 
constitutionalism’ denotes the theories of constitutionalism for global governance. 
2 TM Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990), older versions of 
constitutionalism such as Verdross’ alongside contemporary discussions also contribute to this development. 
A O'Donoghue, ‘Alfred Verdross and the Contemporary Constitutionalization Debate’ (2012) 32 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 799. 
3 J Shklar, ‘The Political Theory of Utopia: From Melancholy to Nostalgia’ (1965) 94 Daedalus 367. 
4 For a discussion on relationship between literature and political treatise see, R Levitas, The Concept of Utopia 
(Peter Lang, Oxford, 2010) xiii. For a discussion of the relationship between utopia and genocide, see ED Weitz, 
A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation (Updated Edition, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
2015). 
5 P Fitting, ‘Utopia, Dystopia and Science Fiction’ in G Claeys (ed), The Cambridge Companion to Utopian 
Literature (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010) 135. 
6 M Dery, ‘Black to the Future: Interviews with Samuel A Delany, Greg Tate, and Tricia Rose’ in M Dery (ed), 
Flame Wars: The Discourse of Cyberculture (Duke University Press, Durham North Carolina, 1994) 188; SR 
Delany, ‘Racism and Science Fiction’ in SR Thomas (ed), Darkmatter (Warner Book, New York City, 2000) 383. 
Fredric Jameson, leading scholar in utopianism, dismissed the work of Octavia E Butler and race-critiques in 
science fiction: ‘As for race, its thematic is relatively neutralised by the presupposition of alien life in the first 
place – which can, to be sure, stand as the allegory of race, as in Octavia Butler’. See F Jameson, Archaeologies 
of the Future (Verso, London, 2005) 140.  
7 D Haraway, How Like a Leaf: An Interview with Thyrza Nichols Goodeve (Routledge, Abingdon Oxfordshire, 
2000) 120. 
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relations’.8 Science fiction provides feminists with a testing ground just as More’s fictional 
island in the South Atlantic or Morris’ future society did for them.9 Walidah Imarisha and 
adrienne maree brown prefer the term ‘visionary fiction’ to encapsulate the ‘organising’ 
potential science fiction has for minority groups and people of colour;10 as Octavia E Butler 
writes of science fiction, ‘[humanity] will go someplace else and be forced to change.’11 Butler 
states that she does not write utopian literature per se, but readers locate ‘hope’ within her 
work.12 This article advocates reading feminist utopian visions as depicted in science fiction 
as a starting point for global constitutionalist debates. 
 
Since it builds on international law and constitutional theory, both of which are gendered,13 
global constitutionalism is also inherently gendered as it often unquestioningly replicates 
patriarchal structures. As they create conservative formations impervious to the everyday 
exercises of constituent power, both international and constitutional law are also resistant 
to change, often requiring constitutional moments of rupture to alter their structures.14 
Feminist legal scholars, such as Catherine MacKinnon, Karen Knop, Hilary Charlesworth and 
Christine Chinkin offer critiques of law’s gendered structures,15 asserting that neither 
constitutional nor international law (as gendered constructs) can readily offer alternative 
governance models. Albeit, as Kimberlé Crenshaw argues, often feminist strategies to 
overcome these constructs fail to consider intersectionality as an imperative.16 It is thus 
necessary to ask whether there is any latent potential for constitutionalism to be an 
instrument of feminist change within international law or whether, as Audre Lorde argues, it 
is impossible to use the Master’s tools to dismantle the Master’s house.17 This article uses 
                                                          
8 P Melzer, Alien Constructions: Science Fiction and Feminist Thought (University of Texas Press, Austin Texas, 
2006) 9. 
9 Ibid 11. 
10 see W Imarisha, ‘Introduction’ in W Imarisha and am brown (eds), Octavia’s Brood: Science Fiction Stories from 
Social Justice Movements (AK Press, Chico California, 2015) 3; K Williams, ‘Demanding the Impossible: Walidah 
Imarisha Talks About Science Fiction And Social Change’ (bitchmedia 13 April 2015), available at 
<https://www.bitchmedia.org/post/demanding-the-impossible-walidah-imarisha-talks-about-science-fiction-
and-social-change> 
11 SW Potts and OE Butler, ‘“We Keep Playing the Same Record”: A Conversation with Octavia E Butler’ (1996) 
23(3) Science Fiction Studies 331, 336 (Octavia E Butler). 
12 A Hairston, ‘Octavia Butler – Praise Song to a Prophetic Artist’ in J Larbalestier (ed), Daughters of Earth: 
Feminist Science Fiction in the Twentieth Century (Wesleyan University Press, Middletown Connecticut, 2006) 
287, 295; J Miller, ‘Post-Apocalyptic Hoping: Octavia Butler’s Dystopian/Utopian Vision’ (1998) 25(2) Science 
Fiction Studies 336, 336. 
13 H Charlesworth and C Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis (Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, 2000); C Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford University Press, Redwood 
City, 1998). 
14 H Charlesworth, ‘International law: A Discipline of Crisis’ (2000) 65 The Modern Law Review 377. 
15 e.g. B Baines, D Barak Erez and T Kahana (eds), Feminist Constitutionalism: Global Perspectives (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2012); H Charlesworth, ‘Alienating Oscar? Feminist Analysis of International Law’ 
in DG Dallmeyer (ed), Reconceiving Reality: Women and International Law (American Society of International 
Law, 1993) 1; H Charlesworth and C Chinkin, ‘The Gender of Jus Cogens’ (1993) 15 Human Rights Quarterly 63; 
H Charlesworth, C Chinkin and S Wright, ‘Feminist Approaches to International Law’ (1991) 85(4) The American 
Journal of International Law 613; C MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge MA, 1989). 
16 K Crenshaw, On Intersectionality: Essential Writings (New Press, New York City, 2019). In international law 
see, AN Davis, ‘Intersectionality and international law: Recognizing complex identities on the global stage’ 
(2015) 28 Harvard Human Rights Journal 205. 
17 A Lorde, Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches (Crossing Press, Berkeley CA, 1984) 110. 
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utopian narratives of women-centric societies found in speculative fiction, specifically 
science fiction to rethink governance and proffer a feminist global constitutionalism.  
Science fiction as a genre is often set in the future and is concerned with ‘scientific and 
technological extrapolation’,18 but there is a move to define the genre not by its content, but 
rather by its function, which is ‘cognitive estrangement’;19 science fiction offers ‘an 
imaginative framework alternative to the author’s empirical environment’.20 Science fiction 
can be understood as a subset of fantasy literature.21 Crucially fantasy offers ‘allegories and 
extensions of the “real world”’, which encourage readers to ‘suspend their disbelief for the 
course of the story’.22 Utopia as ‘no place’ or ‘good place’, traditionally evokes a blueprint for 
better governance. Utopianism, however, is not a ‘place’, it ‘defines a sense of lack that 
stimulates a “desire for a better way of being”’.23 Utopianism and dystopia then are 
contingent; Søren Baggesen shows how the pessimism of dystopia can inspire ‘utopian hope’ 
that society can be changed.24 Reading these utopian/dystopian narratives therefore offers 
both ‘critiques of the contemporary world’ and ‘the presentation of alternate possibilities’.25 
Some utopias created by women will be dystopian for others, whether through the exclusion 
of men, the harmful essentialism or the negation of experiences. The duality of 
utopianism/dystopia offers a critique of the current society, but also a drive for change. These 
utopian/dystopian narratives offer a space for ‘imaginative speculation necessary for 
generating new liberating strategies.’26  
 
Feminist science-fiction utopias have been prevalent within the genre of utopian literature 
since the first speculative fiction; Margaret Cavendish’s Blazing World (1666) is a feminist – if 
conservative – critique of governance. Rokeya Hossain’s 1905 short story, ‘Sultana’s Dream’, 
describes a world where men live in purdah and women lead active public lives.27 Feminist 
utopian texts offer a body of literature that have always been available to governance 
discourse but were largely ignored. The narratives that form the core of this article are: 
Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s Herland (1915) - the article title adapts the title to the sequel With 
Her in Ourland (1916) - Leslie F Stone’s ‘The Conquest of Gola’ (1931); Ursula K Le Guin’s The 
Left Hand of Darkness (1969); Sally Miller Gearhart’s The Wanderground (1979); Sheri S 
Tepper’s The Gate to Women’s Country (1989); Naomi Alderman’s The Power (2016) and N. 
                                                          
18 P Sargent, ‘Introduction: Women in science fiction’ in Women of Wonder (Vintage, New York City, 1975) xiv. 
19 D Suvin, Positions and Presuppositions in Science Fiction (Springer, New York City, 1998) 71–72; See Fitting (n 
5) 135. 
20 Suvin (n 19) 37. 
21 See T Burns and JW Hunter, Contemporary Literary Criticism (vol. 193, Thomson Gale, Michigan, 2005) 137; S 
Gibney, ‘Science Fiction, Feminism and Blackness: The Multifaceted Import of Octavia Butler’s Work’ in S 
Jackson and JE Moody-Freeman (eds), The Black Imagination: Science Fiction, Futurism and the Speculative 
(Peter Lang, Oxford, 2011) 100, 105. 
22 Gibney (n 21) 100, 105. 
23 Levitas (n 4) 221. 
24 S Baggesen, ‘Utopian and Dystopian Pessimism: Le Guin's "The Word for World Is Forest" and Tiptree's "We 
Who Stole the Dream"’ (1987) 14(1) Science Fiction Studies 34, 41.  
25 E James, ‘Utopias and anti-utopias’ in E James & F Mendlesohn (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Science 
Fiction (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) 219. 
26 A Johns, ‘Feminism and utopianism’ in G Claeys (ed), The Cambridge Companion to Utopian Literature 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010) 174.  
27 D Mookerjea-Leonard, ‘Futuristic technologies and purdah in the feminist utopia: Rokeya S. Hossain’s 
‘Sultana’s dream’ (2017) 116 Feminist Review 144. 
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K. Jemisin’s Broken Earth Trilogy (2015-2017). Other texts discussed include: Ursula Le Guin’s, 
‘The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas’ (1973), Joanna Russ’ The Female Man (1975), Marge 
Piercy’s Woman on the Edge of Time (1976), Octavia E Butler’s Xenogenesis series - Dawn 
(1987),28 Adulthood Rites (1988), Imago (1989) - alongside Fledgling (2005), Jewelle Gomez’s 
The Gilda Stories (1991), and N. K. Jemisin’s ‘The Ones that Stay and Fight’ (2016). These 
narratives span the first, second, and third/fourth waves of feminism. The feminist science 
fiction of the first wave concerned questions of suffrage and economic independence and 
explores role reversals through matriarchal and separatist societies. Into the 1970s and 
1980s, the literature uses separatist societies and the reversal of gender roles to pick up on 
debates around women’s sexuality and the ongoing oppression of women.29 Later feminist 
science fiction disrupts gendered power structures through undermining and subverting 
power, often through the use of technology, as seen in Alderman’s The Power.30 Jemisin’s 
Broken Earth Trilogy does not offer a utopia but rather an important counterpoint to a sub-
genre that extends little toward intersectionality or relies upon post-race narratives.31 Whilst 
not complete, this selection offers multi-various ways in which feminist utopian narratives 
could inform global constitutionalist discourse and critiques some of the foibles that feminist 
science fiction shares with global constitutionalism.  
Just as More, Morris and Plato would not agree on their visions of utopia, neither does 
feminist utopian literature. The existence of violence, eugenics, racism, war, class, hereditary 
monarchies and other less recognisable feminist tropes reveals the divergent contexts within 
which these narratives were composed. Le Guin argues that while all of her works invent new 
societies that improve in some way on our own, she regards utopia as too grand and rigid for 
what she does, arguing her works are neither blueprints nor dire warnings but rather 
‘celebrations of that infinite variety by the invention of still more alternatives and 
possibilities’.32 Indeed, Le Guin in a short story set in the same universe as The Left Hand of 
Darkness called ‘Coming of Age in Karhide’ (1995), wrote from a Gethenian perspective to 
complicate her original narrative, which had assumed that relations were restricted to 
‘heterosexual coupling’. 33 This article is not about searching for a blueprint, but rather 
reflecting on the lessons garnered from the different narratives.  
A key concern, particularly for global feminist constitutionalism and utopias, is that many of 
the narratives highlighted were written by white Global North women and we are two white 
female academics from the Global North, with privileged access to the advantages that come 
with that position. In the majority, these are utopias designed for white women. In asking 
‘better for whom’, this article exposes the limitations of these utopian projects. Le Guin 
suggests in ‘The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas’ (1973) that utopias always come with a 
cost, but as Jemisin suggests in ‘The Ones that Stay and Fight’ (2016) this is a false 
dichotomy, there does not have to be suffering for others to have utopia but this is only 
possible in a ‘postcolonial Utopia’ where you stand and fight against the harm of oppression 
                                                          
28 Now published as OE Butler, Lilith’s Brood (Warner Books, New York City, 2000). 
29 Melzer (n 8) 8. 
30 Ibid 8. 
31 NK Jemisin has said that the Trilogy in some ways is a response to Ursula le Guin’s The Ones Who Walk Away 
from Omelas (1973) writ large, see <https://twitter.com/nkjemisin/status/955935985199714304> 
32 U Le Guin, ‘War Without Ends’ from Essays on More’s Utopia (Verso, London, 2016), available at 
<https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/3585-a-war-without-end-by-ursula-k-le-guin>  
33 A Lothian, ‘Feminist and Queer Science Fiction in America’ in G Canavan and EC Link (eds), The Cambridge 
Companion to American Science Fiction (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015) 70, 76. 
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and racism.34 It is this division between utopias that ignore race or assume a ‘post-race’ world 
and those authors who chose to fight the harm directly before establishing the utopia,35 
which demonstrates that not all utopian projects are emancipatory. The division can inform 
our understanding of what is necessary for utopia and highlights questions that need to be 
revisited by global constitutionalism in its utopian project.  
In a previous piece, we outlined a seven-point manifesto for feminist global 
constitutionalism.36 This manifesto calls for: first, women’s genuine participation as agenda 
setters, second, agenda setting that moves beyond a Eurocentric gaze, third, a right of 
rejection, fourth, women co-authors of constitutions, fifth, women’s substantive 
involvement in the continuous unfolding of the constitution, sixth, women as active 
participants with both constituent and constituted power, and seventh, a right of revolt. 
Here, two key elements of that manifesto – attention to constituent and constituted power 
and a right to revolt – alongside a consideration of how these are to be articulated through 
the public/private divide lie at the centre of our exploration.  
The article is divided into five sections: the first section discusses the exclusions within 
utopian projects that surface when asking who benefits from such projects as global 
constitutionalism, and it does so by demonstrating how science fiction has excluded women 
of colour, the second explores constructions of constituent power holders and communities 
as well as the role of constituent moments; the third continues a discussion on constituent 
moments alongside the right to revolt, and against entrenchment of constitutional 
structures; and, the fourth section explores the public/private divide within the descriptions 
of home and motherhood in feminist science fiction. The fifth section of the article reflects 
on the limitations of reading feminist science fiction. Crucially, this section highlights the risk 
that feminist discussions in global constitutionalist debates might reiterate former power 
structures.  
The utility of utopian thinking is a long-established method of critiquing the present and 
facilitating hope for the future. Reading feminist utopias offers us new ways of thinking 
about governance. In challenging global constitutionalism to consider the nature of its own 
project, this article questions whether it listens to feminist concerns as expressed in utopian 
literature.  
 
II. Better for Whom? 
 
                                                          
34 NK Jemisin ‘The One who stands and Fights’ in How Long ‘Til Black History Future Month (Orbit, London, 
2018). 
35 See also ideas of ‘survival’ in the work of Octavia E Butler. HM Zaki, ‘Utopia, Dystopia, and Ideology in the 
Science Fiction of Octavia Butler’ (1990) 17(2) Science Fiction Studies 239, 242; C Robinson, ‘Minority and 
Becoming-Minor in Octavia Butler’s Fledgling’ (2015) 42(3) Science Fiction Studies 483, 484; D Allison, "The 
Future of Female: Octavia Butler's Mother Lode’ in HL Gates (ed), Reading Black, Reading Feminist (Meridian, 
Oldbury West Midlands, 1990) 471. 
36 Aoife O'Donoghue and Ruth Houghton, ‘Can Global Constitutionalisation be Feminist?’ in Sue Harris Rimmer 
and Kate Ogg (eds), Future of Women's Engagement with International Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2019) 
81. 
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Critiques of global constitutionalism should consider whom the global constitutionalist 
project benefits. This ‘better for whom’ question resonates with the feminist utopian science 
fiction.  As Melzer insists, ‘[T]he [science fiction] texts themselves often either propagate a 
typical liberal color blindness or are racist - openly as well as implicitly’.37 Some, such as Le 
Guin, have a definite perspective on making a post-race society, and while in Stone’s ‘The 
Conquest of Gola’, the women are not human, there remains a lack of intersectionality.38 Le 
Guin removes race from her depicted world in The Left Hand of Darkness to make a political 
point. However, this can be problematic if in removing race the narrative silences a group’s 
understanding of itself and its relationship with others. Unlike Jemisin’s ‘stay and fight’ 
science fiction, The Left Hand of Darkness does not provide the vital space for contestation 
on how such a post-race utopia can be created. Of central concern therefore must be the 
extent to which utopian feminist science fiction literature silences racial politics. 
Herland and in particular the sequel, With Her in Ourland, are predicated on racism. Herland 
was written by Perkins Gilman in 1915 and it is a story of three men who go on an exploration 
and venture into a land populated only by women. The people living around Herland and the 
guides who lead the male protagonists there are referred to as ‘savages’.39 The men assume 
that the women of Herland are Aryan.40 When Ellador is described, her darker skin colour is 
eroticised by the narrator.41 Moreover, Perkins Gilman’s non-fiction writing demonstrates 
clearly racist attitudes including eugenics and racist language.42While we discuss Perkins 
Gilman’s Herland, it is its place as an early iteration of feminist science fiction that renders it 
useful for our purposes, rather than dismissing her racism. Indeed, the extent to which 
questions of race are side-lined in these science fiction narratives is fundamental to our 
discussion on whom global constitutionalism benefits. 
In contrast to the texts of Perkins Gilman and Gearhart, there are few separatist societies 
written by women of colour. One explanation for this is the construction of a ‘black 
matriarchy’ during the civil rights movement in America.43 Daniel Moynihan’s 1965 report, 
‘The Negro Family: The Case for National Action’ argued that black families were often led 
by a single woman, the outcome being that black men lacked the confidence to compete 
with white men in the workplace.44 bell hooks explains how ‘[b]lack men were able to use the 
matriarchy myth as a psychological weapon to justify their demands that black women 
                                                          
37 Melzer (n 8) 44–45. 
38 K Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics’ (1989) 1 University of Chicago Legal Forum 
139. 
39 CP Gilman, Herland (1915, Vintage, New York City, 2015) 3. 
40 Ibid 71. 
41 ‘As for Ellador: Suppose you come to a strange land and find it pleasant enough - just a little more than 
ordinarily pleasant - and then you find rich farmland, and then gardens, gorgeous gardens, and then palaces 
full or rare and curious treasures - incalculable, inexhaustible, and then - mountains - like the Himalayas, and 
then the sea’ (Herland (n 39) 119); ‘Celis was a blue-and-gold-and-rose person; Alima, black-and-white-and-red, 
a blazing beauty. Ellador was brown: hair dark and soft, like a seal coat; clear brown skin with a healthy red in 
it; brown eyes - all the way from topaz to black velvet they seemed to range - splendid girls, all of them’ (Herland 
(n 39) 121); see also Herland (n 39) 71. 
42 For a discussion see, DD Knight, ‘Charlotte Perkins Gilman and the Shadow of Racism’ (2000) 32(2) American 
Literary Realism 159, 161. 
43 Hairston (n 12) 287, 292. 
44 See J Donovan, Feminist Theory, Fourth Edition: The Intellectual Traditions (Continuum International 
Publishing Group, New York, 2012) 155. 
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assume a more passive subservient role in the home’.45 Feminists, therefore, contest the 
stereotype of the strong black woman matriarch, a stereotype that Angela Davis has 
criticised for ignoring the experiences of black women.46 This is why it is crucial, when using 
feminist utopias, that all voices are heard; whilst the all-woman society as a thought 
experiment can empower some women, it can exclude and cause further oppression for 
others. 
Some of the feminist science fiction narratives written by white women in the 60s, 70s, and 
80s share the racist and imperialist overtones of other utopian work including More’s. As 
China Miéville argues, a new discourse is therefore essential: 
[a] start for any habitable utopia must be to overturn the ideological bulls*** [sic] of 
empire and, unsentimentally but respectfully, to revisit the traduced and defamed 
cultures on the bones of which some conqueror’s utopian dreams were piled up. 
“Utopia” is to the political imaginary of betterness as “Rhodesia” is to Zimbabwe, 
“Gold Coast” to Ghana.47 
As such, the narratives discussed in this article are not presented as templates to be 
emulated, but rather a way of looking at alternatives unshackled from patriarchal 
preconceptions of governance, with full cognisance of the negative actions that have 
followed when societies have embraced some utopias.48 As Miéville argues, the stain upon 
utopias should not prevent us from examining them.49 Both Alderman in The Power and 
Jemisin in the Broken Earth Trilogy demonstrate that intersectional questions of race, of 
social status, of economic power, of religion, of abuse all must be tackled, to be fought, 
before utopias can emerge and the ‘better for whom’ question given a full answer.  
 
III. Constituent Power and Community 
‘They themselves were a unit, a conscious 
group; they thought in terms of the community’ 
 
(Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Herland (1915, 
Vintage, New York City, 2015) 125) 
 
Feminist utopian narratives consider how communities are constructed, their purpose and 
the role of individual women but critically all through a collective lens. They raise questions 
about the construction and the exercise of constituent power as non-hierarchical 
relationships, realising women’s substantially active engagement in the evolution of the 
constitution as both constituent and constituted power holders and as agenda setters. These 
                                                          
45 bell hooks, Ain’t I a Woman (South End Press, Boston, 1981) 79; Donovan (n 44) 155. 
46 A Davis, ‘Reflections on the Black Woman’s Role in the Community of Slaves’ (1972) 13(1/2) The Massachusetts 
Review 81, 84; Donovan (n 44) 155. 
47 See C Miéville, ‘Introduction’, Thomas More’s Utopia (Verso, London, 2016) i, insertion of *** by article 
writers. 
48 Weitz (n 4). 
49 Miéville (n 47) ii. 
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feminist utopian narratives, in looking at ideas of constituent power, highlight the violence 
of the single constituent moment and advocate for ongoing constituent moments executed, 
for the most part through collective reflection and discussion. These narratives illuminate the 
inter-relation between individuals within collectives to consider how to achieve “The People” 
as a series of persons in dialogue, rather than a homogenous whole.  
In a move away from advocating homogenous communities as a basis for constitutionalism, 
scholars of global constitutionalism have started to proffer constituent power as an 
alternative model.50 The feminist approach to consider the individual within the collective, 
sits in contrast with traditional liberal or republican theories of constitutional communities, 
which either prioritise the individual or the collective.51 These feminist utopias offer 
alternative starting points and questions for global constitutionalist scholarship.  
 
Constituent Power and Constituent Moments 
For constitutionalism, the identification of constituent and constituted power holders as the 
basis of community underpins its legitimacy.52 Liberal constitutionalism is buttressed by the 
myth of the constituent moment as a point of radical change heralding the way for 
constitutional order. In constitutional scholarship, constituent power can be understood as 
either exhausted or as dormant.53 Within global constitutionalism, both constituent power 
and the constituent moment remain peripheral, albeit emerging, debates. If the holders of 
constituent power remain unidentified and thus cannot exercise their warrant, the exercise 
of constituted power is inevitably constitutionally illegitimate.54 Moreover, failure to debate 
the role of constituent moments in global constitutionalist discourse risks transposing 
problematic trends of historicism found in domestic constitutionalism. The feminist texts 
under consideration here problematise the relationship between constituent power holders 
and the constituent moment, highlighting anxieties around constituent power and the 
constituent moment offering new points of departure for global constitutionalist debates.  
The constituent moment is a rupture that heralds a new constitutional order.55 These 
moments are usually preceded by violence and war. For example, within international law, 
World War II is often considered to be the violence that preceded the constituent moment 
that brought about the UN Charter. The violence referred to as constitutive is general 
physical force, such that routine daily violence against women or poverty are not considered 
                                                          
50 See e.g., Aoife O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2014) 54– 87. 
51 MG Dietz, ‘Context Is All: Feminism and Theories of Citizenship’ (1987) 116 Daedalus 1, 2–6. 
52 For a discussion see O’Donoghue (n 50) 56–57. 
53 For a discussion on it being exhausted see, UK Preuss, ‘Constitutional Powermaking for the New Polity: Some 
Deliberations on the Relations between Constituent Power and the Constitution’ (1992-1993) 14 Cardozo Law 
Review 639; For a discussion on it being non-exhaustible see, J Locke, Two Treatises of Government (P Laslett 
ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998) ch II, sec 222. See also DJ Galligan, ‘The Paradox of 
Constitutionalism or the Potential of Constitutional Theory’ (2008) 28(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 343, 
358; JI Colón-Ríos, Weak Constitutionalism: Democratic Legitimacy and the Question of Constituent Power 
(Routledge, Abingdon Oxfordshire, 2012) 8; A Kalyvas, ‘Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent 
Power’ (2005) 12(2) Constellations 223, 227. 
54 See O’Donoghue (n 50) 201. 
55 In contrast see, B Ackerman, We the People, Volume 2: Transformations (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
MA, 2000) 409. 
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as moments of rupture within constitutional discourse.56 Moreover, the violence that 
precedes and occurs during constituent moments is rarely remembered. 
Johns argues that typically utopian narratives ‘rely on revolutionary substitution, abrupt 
regime change, for the origin of the society’.57 She gives the example of More’s Utopia, which 
recounts how Utopus conquered the country overpowering and killing the indigenous 
people.58 Similarly, the history of Herland begins with two violent overthrows, in which 
hierarchies are inverted.59 First, the slaves revolt against their masters – men who have been 
engaged in war with other countries for a long period – killing older women, and seizing the 
younger women in an attempt to take power.60 Then, ‘the young women, instead of 
submitting, rose in sheer desperation and slew their brutal conquerors’.61 It is unclear in the 
narrative whether the slaves are class- or race-based, but either way this depicts the 
oppression of oppressed groups. As Le Guin explores in ‘The Ones Who Walk Away from 
Omelas’, this oppression of a minority suggests the disturbing price of a feminist utopia; a 
question that can be asked of global constitutionalism as well. 
For the most part, the feminist utopias depict a more pluralist picture of the constituent 
moment, often discussing ‘gradual reform and ongoing change’,62 and where violence 
occurs, it is revisited and remembered. Remembering the experience of violence is a repeated 
trope in these texts. In The Wanderground, the women are reminded of the violent past they 
have endured. Gearhart’s The Wanderground is set in a future United States and the narrative 
centres on communities of hill women, who have fled from the City ruled by men. Their 
experiences of rape and torture are recollected by remember-guides and stored in 
Remember Rooms. It is the job of a remember-guide to ‘call up and re-play’ these rapes, 
killings and torture to those who did not know about the past, ‘Lest we forget how we came 
here’.63 Rather than ignoring the violence that precedes a constituent moment, the 
Remember Rooms are a permanent reminder of the violence done to the women. Queer 
theory on history can add an additional reflection here; Heather Love in Feeling Backward 
argues for a ‘politics of the past’, one that does not view negativity and shame in the past as 
useable for progress.64 For Love, an ‘insistence on using negativity as but a stepping stone to 
positive agency is a refusal to fully engage with histories of hurt and to see the persistence of 
this ”history” in the present.’65 Love ‘acknowledges the importance of shame in queer 
politics’, but she ’argues for the need to develop a ”politics of the past” that can work with 
the past without resignifying the stigma that resides there ’.66 The women’s stories are not 
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‘used’ to construct a foundational constitutional myth, they are woven into the community 
and remembered.  
The Left Hand of Darkness is centred on an ambisexual planet where sexuality manifests itself 
once a month for the purposes of reproduction. The people on the planet have a violent myth 
of their founding moment: the planet originally had thirty-nine individuals, all siblings, and 
the first individual to awaken kills thirty-seven of them out of fear.67 In doing so ‘darkness’ is 
created alongside light at a key constitutional moment of founding. A planet with no gender 
still has need for opposites but crucially, these are not antagonistic, but rather part of a 
whole. Unlike other founding myths of governance, such as the US constitution and its 
founding fathers, there is no idealisation of the founder; rather, the founder created, by his 
actions, the darkness that coexists with the light, just as they are both male and female and 
have violence but not war.68 Everyone lives with the darkness and this acts as a reminder of 
the violence of the constituent moment. The histories of the constituent moment and the re-
remembering of the violence subverts constitutionalism’s role in both the suppression of this 
violence and its valorisation.  
Acts of remembrance are problematised in Jemisin’s Broken Earth Trilogy.69 The Broken Earth 
Trilogy is set on a planet with perpetual tectonic activity and three peoples. One of the 
peoples is dominant, a second are either slaves or are murdered and a third are entirely apart. 
The tectonic activity means that entire civilisations are wiped out and the violence of 
extreme events are remembered, but through the lens of the dominant group. Upendra Baxi 
argues constitutionalism works to silence ‘lived and generationally embodied histories of 
collective hurt’.70 The first and dominant group in the Broken Earth Trilogy understand this 
and their attempted silencing forms part of the governance order through histories and rules 
(constitutional rules) written on tablets. The trilogy explores the need for revolt against the 
domination and violence of the first group and the histories they create where violence by 
the dominant group is natural. Jemisin’s feminist science fiction exposes the ‘collective hurt’ 
silenced by constitutionalism.71 
Global constitutionalism does little to remember its oppressive history. The discourse has 
hitherto left little space for critical engagement from feminism or Third World Approaches 
to International Law (TWAIL). It should seek to continually remember its oppressive history 
in the guise of international law and constitutionalism. All too often, however, a negative 
topic, having been considered once, is deemed dealt with, whereas ‘positive’ constitutional 
moments, such as those in 1945 or 1989 or moments of overcoming genocide or human 
rights abuses, are regularly returned to and celebrated. 
In addition to the problematisation of the forgotten violence preceding the constituent 
moment, some of the feminist narratives espouse deliberative change rather than the one-
off rupture found in liberal constitutionalist narratives. Both Herland and The Wanderground 
depict how the separatist societies – living beside but not with patriarchal societies – 
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continue to bring about constitutional change. The gradual growth of Herland is outlined in 
detail; how a small community ‘worked together’ and grew into a nation.72 The narrator 
describes how the women made decisions regarding population growth; ‘[t]hey sat down in 
council together and thought it out’,73 and Somel (one of the guides) further elaborates that 
the problem of overpopulation was ‘equally plain to all – all were equal interested’ and so 
they ‘gave the matter their most earnest thought and study’.74 In The Wanderground, 
decision-making, or ‘sister-search’, is described as a collective and deliberative process.75 
‘When the women meet publicly to debate a political issue around which they are divided, 
for example, they describe this process as an inward movement into a common female 
center of power that they all share’.76 In coming together, the women feel ‘a presence greater 
than any one individual, which ‘makes each woman feel ”more deeply grounded, more vital, 
more steady, more nearly at home”.’77 Thus, cognitive change is a product of deliberation.  
The decision-making practices of these separatist societies have been critiqued for their 
idealisation and essentialism. Scholars argue that communitarian decision-making can work 
to negate agency as the individual voice is lost in the group.78 Moreover, the idealised 
deliberative processes mask problematic choices, such as decisions on eugenics in Herland 
and the potential exclusions of LGBTQ men in The Wanderground. Whilst deliberation is 
evidence of politics rather than the calcification of constitutional moments seen in liberal 
constitutionalism, and in these decision-making processes alternative perspectives are 
heard, essentialism haunts these processes and can conceal layers of oppression. Global 
constitutionalism must be alert to the haunting effects of such essentialism.  
In addition to re-reading constituent moments, feminist utopian literature also offers 
perspectives on constituent power holders. Alessa Johns argues that feminist utopian 
literature includes a sense of ‘shared power’.79 She demonstrates how feminist scholars have 
woven individual women’s narratives into grand histories. For example, in The 
Wanderground, in the Remember Rooms ‘from countless seemingly disconnected episodes 
the women had pieced together a larger picture’ of what happened as they fled the City.80 
Crucially, all stories were collected, ‘however dramatic or mild, however heroic or horror-
ridden’.81 This act of sharing stories is part of the construction of the collective; ‘[a]s a woman 
shared, she became part of all their history’.82 Critical past moments are not stratified, 
glorified, or calcified – as on tablets in The Broken Earth Trilogy - but rather are part of present 
understandings and inform the identification of constituent power-holders. A feminist global 
constitutionalism seeking to identify constitutional moments would not fossilise single 
narratives or events, and neither would it place great importance on fulfilling the intention 
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of past actors; rather, in these feminist texts, constitutional moments inform present 
constituent actors in considering their extant decision making.  
Alderman’s The Power – a dys(u)topian novel set in a modern-day world, but where women 
(re)discover that they have a bar of static electricity in their collar bone and can give electric 
shocks – demonstrates the ‘shared power’ Johns highlights.83 The novel is written from the 
perspective of a series of protagonists – who cross socio-economic, race, religion, gender, 
sexuality, religious and ethnic experiences  – whose narratives collide in various ways over 
the course of the novel. Though ‘Eve’ – a Christ-like figure – acts as a fulcrum around which 
other characters revolve, the characters have very separate roles in bringing about the 
change that results in a female-dominated society (whether it is the journalist exposing 
stories, the female politician facilitating training-centres, or Roxy who takes the lead on 
financing the cult around Eve via drugs trading). They are nodal characters operating in 
different countries, but each is needed to bring about change.  
Global constitutionalist scholarship, as a response to international law, can be reoriented 
towards those actors that act as nodes of governance in a non-linear trajectory.84 
Appreciating ‘nodes’ can disrupt a governance order built around states, but there must be a 
contextual understanding of how those nodes are constructed.85 For example, this might 
entail recognising the impact of the women’s movement on the League of Nations or in the 
creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration or in Security Council Resolution 1325.86 The 
narratives of male-dominated linear progress toward an ever-greater constitutional order 
could be disrupted by this nodular account of action at different moments and sites, not all 
of which need be positively evolutionary. Herland and Women’s Country contain narratives of 
change that reflect needs at that moment, implying that constitutional moments and 
constituent power is not geared toward a Hegelian narrative of progress. 
In The Power, ‘power’ is manifested in the electricity. Through using this metaphor, the 
feminist narrative offers alternative perspectives on ‘power’. ‘Power’ becomes inter-
generational as younger women turn on the electrical abilities of older women.87 The force 
of the electricity, and therefore the ‘power’, is felt in the inter-relation between the person 
giving off the spark and the other receiving it. Alderman describes the ‘arcs’ of electricity that 
the women make between their hands, showing ‘power’ as inter-relational. Electricity is a 
powerful metaphor for how constituent power can be understood, highlighting the need for 
inter-relational activities (e.g. communication), and for an understanding of constituent 
power’s non-exhaustion in the constituent moment. Whilst constituent power can become a 
mythical starting point for a constitutional framework,88 global constitutionalist scholarship 
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should also try to understand how such constituent power can manifest (where it appears, 
its forms, and its dialectic qualities).  
The electricity in the novel is a palpable representation of power; the women describe feeling 
it hum within them and it can cause harm and death. Some actors have more electricity and 
therefore higher status within the novel, some characters have less and are isolated because 
of it, and some (the male characters) have none. The violence that can be perpetrated 
through this power is vividly portrayed through the electrocutions, making the violence of 
‘power’ visible. Some commentators argue this is a dystopian novel because of the arbitrary 
use of power by the women towards the end of the novel. Anxieties of arbitrary power are 
also found in The Wanderground, where the women have combined their energies into 
Gatherstretch; ‘the combined psychic energies of hundreds of hill women generate a 
channelled power which could prove literally lethal’.89 Some of the women want to use the 
power to ‘wipe the City [and thus the men] out now’.90 Scholars have criticised this aspect of 
The Wanderground because it is suggestive of individuals wanting to use power without 
feeling guilt, as they can hide behind the collective.91 The concerns over abuses of power in 
The Power and in The Wanderground and the repeated incidences of mass violence in the 
Broken Earth Trilogy challenge the idealisation of women’s use of power; the idea that 
women in power would exercise it differently from men. Towards the end of the story in The 
Power, Alderman describes the ‘power’: 
The shape of power is always the same: it is infinite, it is complex, it is forever 
branching. While it is alive like a tree, it is growing; while it contains itself, it is a 
multitude […] The closer you look, the more various it becomes.92 
That ‘[t]he shape of power is always the same’ acts as a critique against essentialist 
arguments that women would use power differently. If power is the same, there is the same 
potential for it to be used arbitrarily. The idea of a ‘multitude’ here is critical too, and it 
resonates with the collective in The Wanderground. Power is a form of unison, ‘[w]hen a 
multitude speak with one voice, that is strength and that is power’.93 Yet, the power also 
evokes a sense of diversity as the electricity, as a multitude, becomes ‘more various’.94 Both 
The Wanderground and The Power highlight an ongoing tension about feminist 
conceptualisations of power; how to reconcile women having power with the potential for 
the abuse of power.  
This anxiety around power also highlights the utopian/dystopian duality of science fiction, as 
the dystopian elements reflect that we presently live in a dystopia; there is nothing that 
happens to men in the last third of The Power that is not women’s everyday lived experience 
across the world. Violence is re-appropriated by the female characters in The Power as a way 
of critiquing current uses of violence in society. Utopian narratives are complex, whilst they 
can be seen to offer blueprints, they also draw on the real world; asking the reader to reflect 
on the present where men can abuse power.  
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To read feminist science-fiction utopias through a constitutional lens, exposes critiques of 
the traditional conceptualisations of constituent moments and constituent power. 
Throughout the feminist narratives, the violence of the constituent moment and of wielding 
power is made palpable. Constituent power becomes something that is tangible and 
experienced between people rather than situated with the founding myths of constitutional 
orders. Global constitutionalist debates should heed these calls to account for the structural 
violence underpinning its project and to reconceptualise constituent power as being the 
project of inter-relational exchanges.  
 
Community  
The existence of a global community is critical to global constitutionalism, but how a 
community may be global without providing the necessary ‘other’ that defines community 
remains unanswered.95 Feminist utopian narratives shed light on the import of community 
and offer a myriad of ways to construct communities; sisterhood, shared experience, and 
discourse. Often narrating relations between individuals and between communities, these 
feminist utopias also highlight the dangers associated with seeking a ‘global’ community. 
Community does not have an exact content in political discourse; nonetheless, it holds 
connotations such as collectivity and binarity. Community has both an exclusionary impact 
and a dampening effect on those within and outside its purview.96 Those identified as outside 
a given community, who may nevertheless take part in law creation, are considered 
dispensable. This process of exclusion is based upon notions of commonality or shared 
characteristics where to be in the community is to have something in common with others; 
members of a community must resemble each other in some manner. When based on a 
romanticised ‘original’ community, citizenship is often idealised as masculine, an idyll that 
women always fall short of, particularly women who also fail to meet other idealised 
standards of race, class or gendered performance.97 The dampening effect arises due to the 
absence of space to question the basis of commonality. A community member who 
questions a commonality risks exclusion and to question the commonality from the outside 
is to self-deny admission; one cannot share in a commonality one does not embody and 
embrace.  
Stultified debates on a community’s rationale places any process of change in a conservative 
frame, which must not question the basis on which the community operates. This is further 
underscored by the idealisation of the public active figure – reliant on the existence of a 
private passive alternative – fetishized as the constituent power holder. Narratives of the 
idealised citizen be they noble, active, or good, must always be open to re-evaluation to 
reflect the gendered and often racist stereotypes that accompany them. The binary nature 
of community and its tendency toward dampening debate agitates against it as a fulcrum 
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around which a feminist global constitutionalism could emerge. It would perhaps seem 
strange then that feminist utopias focus on community. 
These traditional ideas of community are critiqued or subverted in feminist science fiction. 
In The Wanderground, the hill women can question the unity of the community. The idea that 
members of a community must resemble each other is evocatively portrayed in the Broken 
Earth Trilogy where the dominant group exploit another people because of a single 
characteristic, while using that characteristic to their advantage. Both Butler and Gomez use 
vampire narratives to explore alternative constructions of communities and options for 
power-sharing. In Gomez’s The Gilda Stories (1991), the sense of community is complicated 
as the protagonist has to navigate ‘overlapping spaces/communities within which she must 
live as, simultaneously, a vampire, a woman, a lesbian, and an African American’.98 Butler’s 
Fledgling (2005) explores options for shared power and cooperation, unbound from 
patriarchal structures, as the vampires and humans gain reciprocal health benefits from their 
interactions.99 Afrofuturist feminist literature constructs black female protagonists,100 
depicting the movements of black bodies across time and space,101 and illustrating how these 
women’s bodies can thrive in dystopian environments as they ‘challenge the white male 
dominant power structure in place’.102 Ideas of survival, revolt and freedom are at the heart 
of how these utopian communities are constructed. Science fiction written by women of 
colour, such as Butler, Jemisin and Gomez, offers crucial alternative perspectives on 
constructions of community and power-sharing due to the multiple intersectional sites of 
potential conflict and discrimination. Reading feminist science fiction then, offers alternative 
possibilities for community.  
 ‘The Conquest of Gola’, a short story originally published in a magazine, Wonder Stories, 
demonstrates a commitment to community. A matriarch tells an audience of Golans (and 
the reader) about an unsuccessful invasion by the Detaxal and their (ultimate) violent defeat. 
The Golans are a technologically advanced society dominated by women, with few men all 
of whom are servants. The Detaxal are a patriarchal society from another planet, seemingly 
Earth. In ‘The Conquest of Gola’, Stone draws a contrast between the individualistic world of 
the Detaxal, and the collective enterprise of Gola. The Matriarch uses collective pronouns 
(‘our’, ‘we’ and ‘ourselves’) to recount their collective overwhelming of the Detaxal invasion 
– where the Detaxal intended to offer/impose patriarchal capitalist progress – and contrasts 
this collective exploit with the Detaxal’s selection of a ‘chosen few’ to invade to Gola.103  
Stone’s story-telling also offers a reflection on the construction of “we”. As the Matriarch 
tells the story, there is an ambiguity around the identity of the audience. This ambiguity 
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draws the reader into becoming part of the Golan; as the Matriarch speaks directly to the 
reader, the reader becomes part of “we”.104 This creates a reflexivity of the self who becomes 
constructed as part of a “we”.105 The sense of belonging is constructed not through common 
characteristics or territory, but rather as both part of a narrative and as an audience that 
experiences events through the narrator.  
Johns outlines how communities are created through a range of ties, such as ‘love, intimacy 
and spiritual connection’,106 and Russ documents the similarities amongst feminist utopian 
narratives, in which communities are constructed through kinship and familial ties.107 These 
kinship ties subvert the nuclear family and thus ‘subvert the sex-gender system by 
disembroiling sexuality from reproduction’.108 For example, in The Female Man, Russ raises a 
world-wide ‘kinship web’,109 in Piercy’s Woman on the Edge of Time, everyone is a relative of 
everyone else, and in Gearhart’s The Wanderground, the hill women have multiple mothers 
and all are sisters. Butler’s Xenogenesis series depicts an extended family of humans, Oonkali, 
animals, plants and the spaceship.110 The ancestral lineage of Perkins Gilman’s Herland 
creates a community where all are descended from a single woman, establishing governance 
without hierarchy. Rather than a historic fetishization of inheritance or ancestry this makes 
all the women in Herland sisters. Their community is based on shared motherhood and 
collective governance – including decisions on reproduction and what to do about the male 
antagonists – through the exercise of constituent power.  
In science fiction written by white women, these narratives often start from an assumption 
of kinship rather than seeking commonality or defining a difference. Respect for one another 
comes from the ties of intimacy. Love and governance are said to sit in a troubled 
relationship,111 given the use of such emotions by autocratic regimes. But, the communities 
in the narratives are neither presented as being constructed from the top-down (i.e. 
propaganda from constituted power holders) nor do they espouse patriotism (see discussion 
below), but rather they focus on the relations between constituent power holders.112 It is not 
love of the state but rather intimacy and respect between constituents. As the narratives 
construct constituent and constituted power holders in a symbiotic relationship, using 
dialogic decision-making, this love and intimacy discussed is also that which constituted 
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power must possess for constituents. Love in this sense requires constituted power to 
recognise the dignity and worth of all constituents.113 
Commentators are wary of these constructions of community because community can be 
‘inimical to individual freedom’.114 Reading Butler shows the problems of assuming the type 
of ‘kinship’ discussed. Butler’s construction of the Ooankalis as a community with collective 
decision-making has been criticised for neglecting ‘the autonomy of the individual’; the 
Ooankalis act ‘in a condescending, paternalistic way that, at times, crosses over into 
oppression’.115 But in Butler’s Xenogenesis series, the collectivism of the Ooankalis is 
contrasted with the competitive and individualistic nature of the humans.116 Through Lilith, 
Butler explains how the individual and the community might be reconciled: 
Humans fear difference.... Oankali crave difference. Humans persecute their different 
ones, yet they need them to give themselves definition and status. Oankali seek 
difference and collect it. They need it to keep themselves from stagnation and 
overspecialization.... You'll probably find both tendencies surfacing in your own 
behavior.... When you feel a conflict, try to go the Oankali way. Embrace difference.117 
It would seem then that the ‘ideal society’ for Butler ‘is one in which the relationship between 
the individual and the larger society is reciprocal and mutually enriching’,118 but that the need 
to continue to ‘embrace difference’ is suggestive that the ideal is not an end-point, but a 
process of continually embracing difference. 
Reading these narratives offers a starting point for re-thinking the demos or current liberal 
strategies of constructing community within international law and global constitutionalist 
literature, which are usually predicated on territory or on the use of ‘all-affected’ or ‘all-
subjected’ people.119 Inter-relationships in the feminist narratives challenge those common 
demos myths around territory and homogeneity in global constitutionalism. These narratives 
offer a commitment to understanding one another and an inter-relational and inter-
generational experience, that ideas of ‘global citizenry’120 predicated on mere presence on 
Earth, do not. This commitment to respect moves discussion away from commonality or 
shared characteristics, which can be predefined, and focuses on inter-relationships and 
connections amongst constituent power holders; as each evolves so too does the 
                                                          
113 B Douglas, ‘What's Love got to do with it’ (Centre for Catholic Social Thought and Practice, March 2017), 
available at <http://ccstp.org.uk/articles/2017/3/21/whats-love-got-to-do-with-it> 
114 Zaki (n 35) 243. 
115 Miller (n 12) 346. 
116 Ibid. 
117 OE Butler, Adulthood Rites (Popular Library, New York, 1988) 90 cited in ibid 346–347.  
118 Miller (n 12) 347. 
119 For example, A Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ in J Klabbers, A Peters and G Ulfstein (eds), The 
Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) 303; JHH Weiler, ‘The Geology 
of International Law – Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy’ (2004) 64 Zaöerv 547. See in contrast, J 
Klabbers, ‘Setting the Scene’ in J Klabbers, A Peters and G Ulfstein (eds), The Constitutionalization of 
International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) 23. 
120 See for example, A Peters, ‘Membership in the Global Constitutional Community’ in J Klabbers, A Peters and 
G Ulfstein (eds), The Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) 153. For 
a discussion on all-affected and all-subjected, see N Fraser, ‘Transnational public sphere: Transnationalizing the 
public sphere: On the legitimacy and efficacy of public opinion in a post-Westphalian world’ (2007) 24 Theory, 
culture & society 7, 21. 
 
 
18 
 
community. When constructing ideas of communities, global constitutionalism must heed 
the feminists’ call for an alternative way of collective life.  
In addition to highlighting alternative ways of constructing communities, the narratives offer 
depictions of the impositions placed on those communities. In ‘The Conquest of Gola’ the 
Golans act collectively to stave off the ‘other.’ The women use telepathy to communicate 
with each other and to attempt to understand the Dextral who have landed on their planet.121 
The Dextral, on the other hand fail to listen to the women, who reject their offer of trade. 
The Golan are not interested in trade and when they are not listened to and as the Dextral 
attempt to impose trade upon them, they blow them up. The women, through collective 
action, fend off the Dextral.122 There is a lesson to be learnt here: in the 16th Century, the 
Amerindians had international law imposed on them when, Francisco de Vitoria accorded 
them protection under international law, after they came under attack by the Spanish, but 
this led to ‘legal’ colonisation123; few listened to what they wanted.124 We can perceive Golan 
violence as an act of self-preservation by those who do not wish to be encompassed, as they 
recognise that trade may be the penumbra of domination. Similarly, the community in The 
Gate to Women’s Country function within a broader world with other nations including 
warrior garrisons and theocratic patriarchal nations. As is common in feminist utopian 
narratives, these patriarchal societies eventually attempt to take them over or ‘fix’ their 
perceived matriarchal governance mistakes. Patriarchal assumptions of ‘good’ community, 
found in liberal thought, never mind more conservative variations, often attempt to silence 
feminist methods of community governance found in utopian tracts. In adopting traditional, 
liberal understandings of community, global constitutionalism imposes notions of a ‘good’ 
community, without consideration of alternative voices as to how this ought to be 
constructed, and thus replicates the acts of correcting feminist – and other –methods.  
Historically – and, at times, in the present – both constitutionalism and international law 
dismantle ways of life through imperialism, colonialism, the imposition of constitutions and 
specific economic policies. Presence on the planet may make an individual part of the global 
space but as each of these examples demonstrate, more is required; non-nuclear kinship, 
collective listening and discussion processes, or indeed respect for a specific community, can 
form an alternative basis for understanding global community and its relationship with 
constituent and constituted power. 
 
IV. A right of revolt: facilitating change  
 
The feminist science-fiction utopias discussed here tell particular stories about the (f)utility 
of the past and the importance of facilitating change. Ideas of Hegelian dialectics or 
narratives of Whiggish progress are absent. Indeed, law and lawyers as sources of progress 
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are truants from governance in these texts, and in their stead is the overthrow of previous 
more recognisable patriarchal constitutional orders.125 In the texts, there is a desire to negate 
the power of the past over the future (e.g. Herland, The Broken Earth Trilogy), or to seek to 
re-write the past (e.g. The Power), and to question the role of traditions. Not entrenching law 
and the impermanence of constitutional arrangements (especially Herland with laws that 
remain in place for less than 20 years as discussed below in contrast to the Broken Earth 
Trilogy where the laws are literally set in stone) are central features of these feminist utopias. 
Our global feminist manifesto includes a right to revolt, which inculcates continual challenge 
to constituted power, but does not undercut constitutionalism to a point of nothingness.126 
The suffrage movements redefined the right to vote as a right to revolt, indeed they had to 
revolt so as to construct a political identity that was not present in the constitutional 
structure that had persisted up to that point.127 For them, to vote was to challenge the nature 
of constituent power, to bring about a substantive change, to revolt. Ewa Plonowska Ziarek 
argues that reinterpreting the right to revolt is a process by which gender politics reclaims 
and redefines politics.128 A vital suffragette legacy within the revolutionary tradition is this 
productive tension between the constituted, institutionalized nature of power and its 
inaugural, constituting force.129 Feminist global constitutionalism must insist on this right to 
revolt as a basis of continued contestation. 
The feminist utopian science-fiction narratives written by white women, discussed in this 
article, rarely start with revolt, but often situate it in their past. These revolts overthrow a 
patriarchal order. As we already discussed, in Herland this is problematic in that the original 
slave revolt is used as an opportunity for the women to assert their constituent power. On 
other occasions, the constituent moment comes about due to an apocalypse such as in The 
Gate to Women’s Country and in The Wanderground it is nature which generates the revolt.130 
The side-lining of the revolt might be a result of the conservative traditions, such as - 
marriage, gender roles, inheritance, race and class-hierarchies - that often prevent or 
suppress revolt, are absent in these narratives. 
In contrast, in The Power and the Broken Earth Trilogy, the revolt itself is a key strand of the 
narrative. In ‘The Conquest of Gola’ resistance to the imposition of patriarchy is narrated 
directly. This right to revolt against oppression or ‘stay[ing] and fight[ing]’ as Jemisin 
outlines, is an essential element of obtaining a utopian vision. Vigilance to ensure an end to 
all forms of domination, and revolting against the return or re-assertion of patriarchy, of 
racism, or other harms is necessary.131  
The feminist utopian narratives depict how governance systems can build around this right 
to revolt. Within the utopian science fiction, there is a motif of dispelling traditions and of 
facilitating and embracing change. The right to revolt, to call for change, is ever-present in 
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these shifting societies. In Herland, the women deny the role of the past with respect to law 
and governance. They actively dispel the hold of potential “foremothers”: 
‘Have you no respect for the past? For what was thought and believed by your 
foremothers?’ 
‘Why, no’ she said, ‘why should we? They have all gone’.132 
Theirs is a society of process. Moadine, a female mentor in the story, explains to the narrator: 
‘We have no laws over a hundred years old, and most of them are under twenty’.133 This 
commits them to non-entrenchment; it creates a space for constant change and reflection.  
As noted above, in constitutional scholarship, constituent power can be understood as either 
exhausted or as dormant.134 In The Power, the women feel the hum of electricity within them 
and this offers a palpable metaphor of non-exhaustible constituent power, which has the 
potential to demand change and flip the existing physical pre-eminence of the genders. The 
constant of Alderman’s power is various, demands relations between constituent and 
constituted power holders, and represents the potentiality of change. Any global feminist 
constitutionalism, to ensure the substantive nature of constituent and constituted power, 
would require an account which takes cognisance of the non-exhaustive, relational nature of 
constituent power that always contains the latent power of revolt. Instead of John Locke’s 
dormant constituent power in abeyance until revolt is a necessity, the discussion should 
facilitate other resistances and exchanges.135  
As a genre, feminist science-fiction utopias are commonly works of ‘process-orientated 
feminist utopianism’.136 Johns identifies five features of ‘process-orientated’ utopias: 
education and intellectual development; the malleability of human nature; ‘a gradualist 
approach to change, a cumulative approach to history and a shared approach to power’; the 
dynamism of the non-human world; and, pragmatism.137 Such characteristics can be 
instrumental to a feminist approach to global constitutionalism. Examples such as the lack 
of binaries and the malleability of human nature were discussed in the context of The Left 
Hand of Darkness, and the cumulative approach to history and shared power were explored 
through The Wanderland.  
Education, as a feature of ‘process-orientated’ utopia, underscores processes that facilitate 
change. In Herland there is a commitment to learning about the men’s country, their world 
and their experiences, whilst also ensuring that the men learn about Herland through books, 
tours, and conversations. Perkins Gilman subverts the visitor trope, which has traditionally 
been an ‘unmediated account [sic] of the merits of utopia’, and replaces it with the visitors’ 
responses contrasted with the inhabitants’ perceptions.138 The women of Herland long to 
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learn more about the world, and moreover to understand difference. The women ask the 
visitors to 
tell them about the big world outside, to draw sketches, maps, to make a globe, even, 
out of a spherical fruit, and show the size and relation of the countries, and to tell of 
the numbers of their people.139 
This two-way education between visitors and inhabitants ensures ‘genuine dialogue at 
places in the text’, which contrasts with more ‘unidirectional and monologic transmission of 
information’ in traditional utopian narratives.140 The longing to understand their new visitors 
is evocative of a new approach to governance, as it implies embracing otherness rather than 
rejecting it out of hand. The desire of the women of Herland to learn and understand the men 
before acting is a template for engagement as it is through learning and knowledge that 
relations are fostered and potential collaborative change occurs.  
The ideal of being able to come together through a mutual process of learning is not 
necessarily a reality for marginalised groups. This is because racism and a process of 
‘othering’ is pervasive in society. Hoda M Zaki argues that in her science fiction, Butler 
demonstrates the pervasiveness of ‘othering’ as she ‘imagines humans seizing upon physical 
differences once again to assert an illusory superiority’.141 The humans in the Xenogenesis 
series, ‘seize upon biological differences between the two species to reassert, yet again, 
notions of inferiority and discrimination’.142 For Butler, Zaki argues, there is a human need to 
alienate people who are different.143 Jim Miller points to Lilith’s call to indoctrination in 
Adulthood Rites as a way to overcome xenophobia.144 The imposition that indoctrination 
connotes is suggestive of the sheer pervasiveness of racism and the challenge people of 
colour and minorities face overcoming it. Idealistic processes of learning from one another 
cannot just be assumed, as they are in Herland, but must be demanded. 
The idea of unlearning biases is explored in The Left Hand of Darkness. The novel charts a 
process of unlearning where the male human visitor must unlearn his stereotypical 
preconceptions of gender and governance in an ambisexual society. His distrust of an ally is 
entirely based on that character’s perceived feminine traits where the human is expecting a 
form of political acumen, which is entirely male. The search for the familiar bars other, 
unexpected voices from the discourse. In The Left Hand of Darkness, the society requires that 
you discuss everything on the basis of equality, which means they never ‘mansplain’; 
however the human visitor misinterprets this as equivocation, wanting instead for 
constituent and constituted power holders to be combative in their deliberations.145 The 
combative relationship is ingrained in liberal constitutionalism, where the separation of 
powers means that it identifies a form of aggressive and dominant authority which must be 
divided to hold in check any egotistical and avaricious overstretching by one set of 
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constituted power holders over another, or indeed over constituents.146 Yet, as shown above, 
this can be questioned. 
Education, then, is a form of, or underpins, revolt and change. In ‘The Conquest of Gola’, 
initially the women do not see anything of worth that they could learn from the men and 
when they converse with them using the technology of Golan, this is confirmed. While the 
initial military successes of Detaxal’s invasion could appear to be a form of knowledge 
imparted to the Golan, this is merely education in violence and competition which is 
ultimately defeated by the women’s own knowledge and cooperation. The Broken Earth 
Trilogy also requires an unlearning. The core character must unlearn what she has been 
taught is inevitable about herself and her society. The entire society must unlearn their 
constructed history and governance that has led to enslavement, classed society, murder, 
distrust and the revolt of nature itself. Learning to live together and to co-operate takes time 
and is far from easy. Education and access to knowledge is itself part of the revolt. Global 
constitutionalism needs to depart from processes of “education” in the history of 
international law (i.e. civilisation missions) and facilitate deliberative, two-way listening and 
learning from each other. 
International and constitutional law has experience in adopting a “scientific” attitude 
towards other cultures, where there was little interest in listening but rather in studying 
others as objects to be educated in the correct use of law. One such example is Vittoria’s 
engagement with the Amerindians discussed above, where granting them protection under 
international law, led to ‘legal’ colonisation.147 Such impositions are racist and can also be 
seen in the creation of state boundaries and nations under the Trusteeship and Mandate 
system,148 or the processes of peace-making under Security Council 1325,149 which 
demonstrates a failure to listen to those purported to be included. There is a desire to pass 
on knowledge but little wish to receive. The system that enables the imposition of 
constitutions largely written in Whitehall or New York or the allowing of states that had 
‘reached’ a Western conception of civilisation into the international legal system would need 
to be dismantled rather than calcified through a process of constitutionalism.150  
Reading these feminist narratives alongside the idea of ‘a right to revolt’, uncovers new 
perspectives on governance and constitutional change. The traditional constituent moment 
is critiqued in these narratives and in its stead are ideas of ongoing processes to facilitate 
change. Substantive engagement as constituent and constituted power holders requires 
learning, listening, engagement and knowledge, and any global feminist constitutionalism 
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must account for that in its processes. Where such engagement is absent, a feminist 
constitutionalism must be able to revolt. 
 
V. Homes: Public/Private Divide 
 
‘They had no exact analogue for our word “home”, any 
more than they had for our Roman-based “family”’ 
(Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Herland (1915, Vintage, New 
York City, 2015) 125) 
Underlying the alternative approaches to constituent power, constituent moments and 
community in feminist science fiction is a dismantling of the public/private divide. The 
personal violence experienced by the women becomes political – or part of their 
constitutional arrangements – as it is remembered. The ideas of community in the texts, 
building on respect and dialogue, are a manifestation of striking a balance between the 
individual/personal and the community/political. Fitting argues that there has been a shift 
within science-fiction writing, generated as a response to the feminist movements of the 
1960s, which moves away from designing a society’s laws and institutions, to exploring the 
‘lived reality of the characters’.151 As a manifestation of ‘the personal is political’, these texts 
often focus on the everyday, exposing older dichotomies between the public and the private 
as well as labour divisions between the home and the workplace.152 Indeed, an additional way 
in which the public/private divide is unpacked in the narratives is through the use of 
motherhood and home. 
One prominent feature of the feminist science fiction texts is the dominance of motherhood. 
In The Left Hand of Darkness every individual can be both a mother and a father and often – 
defying the stereotypes held by the human visitor – will be both. Indeed, the human laughs 
when hearing that the King is pregnant but realises his reaction is based on the whole notion 
of a king – who he has constructed as male – being pregnant, whereas the Gethenians laugh 
because they think the King is too old.153 Child-rearing is carried out as part of a strong family 
group in one nation and collectively in another, though no major character is shown 
undertaking childcare. When all can be mothers and fathers, any construction of one as 
functioning in the public and one in the private realm is unnecessary. The state has provision 
for the monthly kemmer where mating occurs – though not necessarily pregnancy – and 
again as everyone is subject to this monthly biological requirement, this is not private but 
part of society. 
In Herland state governance becomes synonymous with motherhood. Perkins Gilman 
constructs motherhood as a collective enterprise.154 Children are raised collectively, and the 
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enterprise of Herland is to raise the children: ‘[t]he children in this country are the one center 
and focus of all our thoughts. Every step of our advance is always considered in its effects on 
them – on the race. You see, we are Mothers’.155 Motherhood is something desired, but 
partially this is because motherhood is not disruptive of the women’s other roles in society 
as farmers or artisans or engineers and it is completely supported. The process by which they 
become mothers, which is asexual, means that pregnancy is always wanted. There is no 
divide between the public and the private; all are mothers, and all equally contribute to 
society. Problematically, the women are horrified by abortion, which is tied to Perkins 
Gilman’s views of eugenics. The freedom of bodily autonomy that these women have is 
therefore somewhat threatened by Perkins Gilman’s wider views of society. Which highlights 
that these narratives are offered as a starting point for discussions and not as blueprints.  
The Broken Earth Trilogy further complicates the idealisation of motherhood. Jemisin writes 
about the central protagonist’s initial rejection by her own mother, forced motherhood as 
public service, her effort to hide herself in the cloak of private everyday motherhood, and her 
attempts to teach about and hide her children’s nature, a nature that could and does lead to 
death or enslavement. Here motherhood is part of the dystopian narrative where baring a 
child into slavery is something that a protagonist initially accepts but eventually it forces her 
to make a devastating decision.156 The mother – daughter relationship forms a significant 
element of the strive toward creating a future utopia, and the complications in the 
relationship signify the complexity of the world that must be taken apart and the variety of 
paths open to doing so.  
In Herland, diplomatic practices, such as their response to the men, are interconnected with 
hospitality and activities traditionally viewed as within the home (such as cooking, cleaning, 
reading). In Herland the men are taken to a room with a bathroom and given a communal 
meal. As Phillips notes, ‘The women return patient understanding, meting no punishments 
[initially]’.157 Governance does not occur in a place apart; it happens everywhere. That one of 
the male characters argues that there is no home in Herland exposes the extent to which that 
divide between the home and the public sphere has been dismantled. This is confirmed when 
the other male character replies that there is nothing else but home: 
“Home!” he sneered. “There isn’t a home in the whole pitiful place.” 
“There isn’t anything else, and you know it.”158  
The Roman ideal of a public active male figure also dominant in the private home, which the 
male visitors harken back to is replaced with an absence of specific sites of governance. 
Governance can and does happen everywhere in Herland. These utopian tracts explore how 
dismantling the public/private divide might manifest itself.  
A common critique of feminist science fiction, and of the separatist societies created in some 
of the texts, is the essentialism of femininity that comes with a focus on motherhood. For 
example, there is potentially a ‘fetishization of the virtues of Motherhood, its emphasis on 
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the sacred duties of childcare, and its repeated stress on the purity and virtue of the utopian 
women’.159 Susan Gubar argues that ‘Gilman’s strategy of [role] reversal threatens to 
invalidate her feminism by defining it in precisely the terms set up by the misogynists it would 
repudiate’.160 Angelika Bammer argues that in these separatist narratives there is an 
‘unsettling convergence between a vision of what women, under utopian conditions, could 
be, and the normative definition of what a woman, according to the prevailing ideology 
should be’.161 Butler is also criticised for her focus on motherhood,162 but here we should 
reflect on the role of family in Butler’s work; the non-nuclear families constructed by Butler 
challenge the status quo, and her black female protagonists ‘create communities as a way to 
rescue and redefine humanity’.163 Essentialism in a utopia can cause harm, but it is still 
relevant for the instructive work that community, home and motherhood are doing within 
the utopian narrative. These utopian texts offer possibilities, not blueprints; they serve to 
critique the present as much as they dream about the future. 
International legal institutions have entirely failed to include women.164 Most recently, we 
learnt that only 7 per cent of the International Law Commission’s membership has been 
female. The public/private divide and the continued relegation of women in the later means 
that expertise, knowledge and experience are absent from public decision-making and will 
be absent from constitutional formation and evolution. Feminist international law scholars 
have already told us about needing to question the public/private divide.165 The absence of 
women from the public sphere within international law necessitates a rethinking of the 
public/private divide before a feminist constitutionalist process can begin. Dismantling the 
public/private can, however, lead to essentialism, where ideas of the ideal woman as mother 
permeate. That these texts are haunted by essentialism in their attempts to highlight 
patriarchal oppression serve as a remember that challenging the public/private divide in 
global constitutionalism must be mindful of harmful idealism.  
 
VI. “Ourworld”: critiques 
 
Whilst feminist utopias are useful for global constitutionalist scholarship, there are 
limitations. Utopian literature is critiqued by feminist scholars for offering unrealistic 
blueprints through ‘end-state’ narratives.166 Moreover, feminist utopias written by white 
women have clear problematic relationships with questions of race and intersectionality. The 
critique of the end-state narrative highlights the need for constant re-evaluation, and the 
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exclusion of and discrimination of women of colour in the narratives here, echoes the 
exclusions in global constitutionalist debates. Reading feminist utopian narratives can offer 
an embarkation point for feminist global constitutionalism but only if it inculcates these 
critiques and evolves beyond the limitations of both. 
In contrast to the process-orientated feminist narratives that abound within feminist science 
fiction, The Gate to Women’s Country and The Wanderground offer static, end-state 
models.167 These end-state narratives have been criticised for offering an idealistic 
unattainable blueprint. This is particularly problematic from a feminist perspective, as Lucy 
Sargisson argues, the relationship between equality and difference should not be presented 
as closed.168 Striving towards equality, whilst also accommodating difference is complex, it 
requires constant reassessment. The Broken Earth Trilogy and the work of Butler aptly sets 
out the necessity and potential processes for accommodating that difference before creating 
a utopian world. Likewise, striking the balance between the individual and a community is an 
ongoing process. With their fixed conclusions, end-state or blueprint narratives fail to fully 
embrace the need for discursive re-assessment. As the discussion on constituent power 
highlighted, there must always be scope for reflective practice and change. 
As a utopian project, global constitutionalist debate should be awake to the problem of the 
fixed conclusions of the end-state narrative, as it hampers the need to constantly assess the 
relationships between groups of people. While the early calls for the recognition of an 
existing constitutional order has faded, such end-state narratives remain a constant in the 
global constitutionalist debate.169 Aspects of global constitutionalism call for the scaling up 
of domestic constitutional practices or principles,170 such as the rule of law and the separation 
of powers,171 and yet feminist political scientists and theorists expose the gendered 
structures of these domestic constitutional principles and democratic processes.172 Striving 
for the translation of domestic models as a conclusion merely replicates old hierarchies. 
Rather, global constitutionalism requires reflexivity if it wishes to build genuine capacity for 
changes to power structures.  
Global constitutionalism, like elements of feminist scholarship and feminist science fiction, 
has insufficiently engaged with questions of race. Western-centric global constitutionalist 
debates need to consider their construction of the Global South.173 TWAIL exposes 
international law’s colonial foundations and by extension aspects of global constitutionalism 
that transpose those same foundations.174 Vidya Kumar criticises those debates in which 
countries of the Global South are ‘mentioned as an aside’ and the power differentials 
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between the Global North and South are taken as pre-determined, rather than as something 
being re-produced within global constitutionalism.175 Using Boaventura de Souza Santos’ 
‘sociology of absences’,176 Kumar argues that ‘global constitutional theory by global 
constitutionalists involves the active non-production of the Global South – as an object or as a 
subject – of the global legal order’.177 The Global South and its people are, Kumar and de Souza 
Santos argue, purposively constructed out of global constitutionalist narratives. Developing 
a Critical Race Theory approach to international law, Ruth Gordon argues that terms such as 
north/south used in TWAIL are ‘preferred terms of reference’, but that these can overlook 
explicit questions of race.178 She focuses on the racist imperialist impulses that underpin 
international law projects, and she stresses that ‘certain voices, usually colored voices, are 
silenced or ridiculed in the international system’.179 Utilising western-centric feminist science 
fiction alone, as this article can rightly be criticised for doing, risks replicating the structures 
of international law, by failing to revolt against oppression and failing to engage with the 
experiences of all women. 
Melzer notes the constructed invisibility of black writers and characters in science fiction.180 
Taking heed from Melzer, this article seeks to expose the silence around women of colour’s 
voices in global constitutionalist literature; experiences from black women, women in the 
Global South and/or subaltern women are seldom heard. This article calls for global 
constitutionalist debates to ensure genuine space for the experiences of all women and 
moreover, to listen to them.181 As two white women, from the Global North, constructing 
ourselves as representatives is an additional layer of oppression for those women 
constructed out of international legal debates.182 Using silence to highlight a group’s 
exclusion is controversial, as it can be understood as further excluding groups of people.183 
Highlighting a silence can, however, flag where groups have been excluded from political 
processes and discourses and operate as ‘an indication of their presence’,184 silence can also 
be a mobilizing force, where the silence must be broken.185 This article uses silences that 
need to be broken as an example of feminist practice in action to highlight how global 
constitutionalists’ utopias will reconstruct existing power structures if we fail to listen to 
marginalised voices:186  
                                                          
175 Kumar (n 173).  
176 B de Sousa Santos, ‘Public Sphere and Epistemologies of the South’ (2012) XXXXVII (1) Africa Development 
43, 52. 
177 Kumar (n 173).  
178 R Gordon, ‘Critical Race Theory and International Law: Convergence and Divergence’ (2000) 45(5) Villanova 
Law Review 827, 830. 
179 Ibid 840. 
180 Melzer (n 8) 44. 
181 J Maggio, ‘“Can the Subaltern Be Heard?” Political Theory, Translation, Representation and Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak (2007) 32 Alternatives 419, 421. 
182 GC Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ in C Nelson and L Grossberg (eds), Marxism and the Interpretation of 
Culture (University of Illinois Press, Illinois, 1988) 271. 
183 B Parry, ‘Problems in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse’ (1987) 9(1/2) Oxford Literary Review 27, 35 (Parry 
is responding to GC Spivak’s ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ (n 182). 
184 S Dingli, ‘We Need to Talk about Silence: Re-examining Silence in International Relations theory’ (2015) 21(4) 
European Journal of International Relations 721, 724. 
185 Lorde (n 17) 42. 
186 These paragraph signs are there to acknowledge voices that are not always listened to within global 
constitutionalist discourse and it is impossible for us to articulate what others would say in this space.  
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¶ 
¶ 
¶ 
¶ 
VII. Conclusion  
 
To me the important thing is not to offer any specific hope of betterment but, by 
offering an imagined but persuasive alternative reality, to dislodge my mind, and so 
the reader’s mind, from the lazy, timorous habit of thinking that the way we live now 
is the only way people can live. It is that inertia that allows the institutions of injustice 
to continue unquestioned. 
(Ursula Le Guin, ‘War Without Ends’ from Essays on More’s Utopia (Verso, London 
2016)) 
 
Reading feminist science-fiction utopias offers a useful starting point for reconfiguring global 
constitutionalist debates towards feminist ideals. Science fiction and utopian narratives 
create fora to explore new political spaces and potential orderings, which can benefit 
women. Though they lack influence within political theory and legal studies, these feminist 
utopias offer political imaginaries, which should be read alongside those utopian narratives 
written by men that are perceived as key political texts. Global constitutionalism is an 
idealistic venture, but it disregards the sexist and racist oppression of the past, is built on old 
hierarchies, and seeks to reconstruct traditional gendered structures from the domestic for 
the international. Feminist utopianism, in the words of Le Guin, brings an end to this inertia 
and offers alternative approaches to community and governance.  
The narratives explored in this article highlight the complexities of constructing 
constitutional communities and of identifying constituent power holders. The variety of 
approaches used in the narratives to create a sense of community challenge the traditional 
role of ‘territory’ as a basis for demos in international law. A common theme in the narratives 
is the role of non-nuclear familial ties and kinship as the basis for community, which place 
people, their experiences, and their inter-relations with one another as an alternative starting 
point for global constitutionalism. The public/private divide, which is fundamental to the 
liberal understanding of constitutionalism, is absent from these feminist science-fiction 
utopias. The home and mothering are public, shared experiences and in some instances 
forms of governance. Tensions created by the essentialisation of home and motherhood, are 
a reminder that whilst global constitutionalism can no longer ignore the private-sphere and 
must seek to include women in the public-sphere, it must be alert to different approaches to 
the private-sphere.  
The constituent moment, an act of founding a community and its constitutional 
arrangements, is explicitly acknowledged as violent by feminist writers; the violence can be 
lived and re-played and is visceral. Yet, in addition to these founding moments, the feminist 
communities are in a constant state of reflection and change. Thus, decision-making within 
the feminist communities is undertaken deliberatively with all as constituent power holders. 
Individuals join discussions to solve problems, rather than relying on a constitutional order 
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granted to them by forefathers. Global constitutionalist debates should question the 
traditional narratives of both community construction and founding moments and should 
not replicate the exclusion from constitutional processes that plague domestic systems. 
The feminist narratives explored in this article highlight the continued dismissal of questions 
of race in the genre. Implicit and explicit racism pervade science fiction. Feminist science 
fiction authors such as Jemisin, Butler and Gomez expose how common tropes within white 
feminist science fiction, such as the matriarchal society, can cause further oppression for 
women of colour by either operating in a post-race world, creating apparent white women 
only spaces and negating their experiences. Women of colour, and questions of race, are 
frequently marginalised within global constitutionalist debates, where the transferral of 
liberal constitutional practices and principles to the international level is prioritised. Heeding 
the lessons from these feminist science-fiction utopias that revolt against and survive 
through oppression, global constitutionalism must revisit its foundations. In addition, global 
constitutionalism should ensure that all women, and not just a select privileged few, are 
listened to. Recalling the manifesto for a feminist global constitutionalism, all women from 
all ethnicities and classes should be welcomed as constitutional agenda setters; they should 
have the right to reject constitutional change and retain their right of revolt; they should be 
active participants of both constituent and constituted power and co-authors of 
constitutions; and they should have substantive involvement in the evolution of the 
constitution. Global Constitutionalism should be rejected as a discourse if it fails to reflect 
the world and all its inhabitants lived experiences. Constitutionalism and international law 
have both been long critiqued for their exclusions and oppressions, there is no excuse for 
continuing these exclusions and oppressions in apparently new discourses. 
Utopian narratives found in feminist science fiction, provide an insight into feminists’ 
critiques of current governance structures and political orders. They are offered here as a way 
in which international law, as a discipline, can retheorize its foundations. The possibilities and 
the questions raised in feminist science fiction offer a way through which global 
constitutionalism can be reflexive and sufficiently acknowledge the iniquities of the past and 
present.  
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